"Modeling Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets" was the general theme of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, held from September 21 to 25, 1986 at the Zentrum fUr Interdisziplinare Forschung in Bielefeld, Germany. This volume contains the papers presented at this conference in a revised and condensed form. The discussed topics concern experimental economics in general, unilateral and bilateral decisions, auctions and markets, and the problem of coalition formation. A selective bibliograpghy of the participants' work in the field of experimental economics is added. On behalf of the Conference Board and of the Gesellschaft fur Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung we express thanks to the Zentrum fur Interdiszipl inare Forschung for organizing and financing the conference. We owe thanks also to an anonymous donor for additional financial support. We thank Ulrich Vossebein and Sigrid . Manthey for their help in preparing the conference and this publication. Reinhard Tietz Wulf Albers Reinhard Selten CONTENTS PREFACE III CONTENTS v I.
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS Reinhard Tietz 3 Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behavior - Introductory Remarks to the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics - Daniel Kahneman 11 Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective II. UNILATERAL DECISIONS Monika Isis Ksiensik and Dirk Wendt 21 Normative and Individual Strategies in Social Dilemmata Friedel Bolle 37 Learning to Make Good Predictions in Time Series John D. Hey and Valentino Dardanoni 51 A Preliminary Analysis of a Large-Scale Experimental Investigation into Consumption under Uncertainty Oswald Huber 66 Mental Representation in Multistage Decision Making III.