For much of the last three decades or more economic methodology has been dominated by the work of Karl Popper who advocated the position that science is what it is by virtue of its adherence to certain ideals. The methodology of science is therefore not empirical or descriptive, but rather a set of rules for producing `rational' or `objective' knowledge. This volume presents alternatives to an exclusively Popperian methodology: its purpose is not to reject Popper, but to show there are other ways of construing methodology.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I contains two critical surveys -- one dealing with the rule-based tradition which has had a great influence on economic methodology in the last three decades and the other arguing for the social conditioning of knowledge. Part II is concerned with auxiliary hypotheses needed to link rational choice at the social and individual levels. Part III follows up on aspects raised in linking rational choice at the social and individual levels by looking at specific issues, including rhetoric and economics and gender and economic research.