Springer Sivumäärä: 149 sivua Asu: Pehmeäkantinen kirja Painos: 1968 Julkaisuvuosi: 1968, 01.01.1968 (lisätietoa) Kieli: Englanti
Many critics seem to consider it inappropriate or unnecessary to ask what Montaigne means by the faculty of judgment. Laumonier speaks of "Ie bon sens, qu'il oppose si souvent a la memoire et qu'il appelle encore 'jugement' et 'entendement', c'est-a-dire la faculte de penser et de reflechir juste. " 1 Our appreciation of what is implied by judgment, that is by Montaigne's notion of judgment, has been delayed perhaps by a too facile acceptance of a so-called synonymity of meaning among the psychological terms used by Montaigne. In a discussion of key concepts in Montaigne, Donald M. Frame has accurately summarized the present situation with regard to our knowledge of Montaigne's notion of judgment and other key concepts: "We all have our hunches, but we need more than that. " 2 For the expression of his interest and concern for the intellectual and moral activities and capabilities of the mind, Montaigne draws upon a broad and elementary semantic field. These primary psychological terms are jugement, entendement, sens, raison, discours, and conscience. Al- though these words may be used synonymously, Montaigne does seem to maintain certain basic distinctions among them; frequent substi- tutions of terms must be the result of semantic and ideational differ- ences. Moreover, the association of several psychological words within a single sentence implies gradations, however slight they may be.
