Questions concerning the methods and techniques of legal reasoning have always been of great interest to judges and lawyers, and even more so to legal scholars. In this book, I want to explore the action-guiding capacity of two general, normative theories of legal reasoning, developed by Neil MacCormick and Ronald Dworkin, respectively, and one normative theory of statutory interpretation developed by William Eskridge.

More specifically, the aim of the book is to determine whether any of these theories will take us further than the so-called legal method, and, if so, whether it can give us the kind of concrete guidance we need when confronted with a hard case. Suppose a judge or an attorney or an administrator really understood and could apply these theories. Would they be of any use to him when faced with a hard case? Would they be able to guide him to a decision when the interpretive arguments conflict with one another?

Den centrala frågan i boken är huruvida Ronald Dworkins, Neil MacCormicks eller William Eskridges teorier om juridisk argumentation skulle kunna ge domare och andra rättstillämpare vägledning i fall där den juridiska metoden inte ger någon hjälp. För att kunna besvara denna fråga tillämpar författaren de olika teorierna på drygt 40 rättsfall hämtade från fyra olika rättssystem, däribland svensk rätt.