The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Camp David summit between U.S. president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasser Arafat in July 2000 are still hotly debated by scholars and experts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In pointing out the myriad of reasons for the breakdown, some have pointed to flaws in leaders' personalities and differences in negotiation styles; others have stressed the lack of sufficient preparations for the summit and the initial unbridgeable differences between the parties attending it. Most experts, however, agree that domestic considerations played a major role in the summit progression and eventual breakdown. This book highlights the attempts to salvage peace against the backdrop of intensifying violence during the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the role of domestic factors, particularly public opinion in determining the conduct of Israelis and Palestinians since the beginning of the second intifada. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.