This monograph offers a comprehensive study of contingent a priori truths. Building onto a theoretical framework developed by the philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, the author also presents a new approach to these truths.



The first part of the book details the many theories on contingent a priori truths. The coverage examines the cases of Kripke and David Kaplan, Donnellan and the de re requirement, Evans and weak contingency, as well as Plantinga, Salmon, Soames, and the pseudo a priori. Overall, it provides a systematic discussion and critical review of all these many positions.



Next, the author develops an alternative approach. His working hypothesis is that performative verbs must play a central role in Kripke’s examples, even if they do not show up at the surface structure of the corresponding sentences. This opens up an entirely new way of looking at Kripke’s cases and of treating them by exploring some aspects of the theory of illocutionary acts. His discussion also examines brute facts and institutional facts, indexicals and performatives, as well as Frege’s theory of definitions.



Providing an authoritative exploration into contingent a priori truths, this book will be of interest to students, academics, and researchers in philosophy and logic.