This study of the American Civil War aims to embed some new arguments, both persuasive and provocative, in a narrative framework. The author argues that the war was not as "modern" as has been suggested, but more closely resembled Napoleonic warefare in important respects. He also examines the relationship between military and political affairs: of assessing the extent to which strategy on both sides developed out of political sources. To the traditional question "why did it take the North so long to subjugate the South?", the suggestion in this book is that the question is misconceived: that in the circumstances of the time, the subjugation was achieved in a short period, with great efficiency. Interpretations have argued that the Confederacy, given the imbalance of resources, should have adopted a defensive strategy, but this volume aims to demonstrate that this view is based on the erroneous assumption that the defensive is more economical in casualties. The text also addresses the theory that Grant and Sherman were somehow more forward-looking than Lee and Johnston.
The author introduces readers to the heart of the issues surrounding the conduct of the war and dislodges many of the conventional wisdom that have attached to its history.