A POLITICAL HISTORY OF JAPAN DURING THE MEIJI ERA 18671912 PREFACE AT no time since the Ru, sso Japanese War has the interest in Japans foreign policy been so widespread as at present., and seldom, if ever, has it been more difficult to comprehend Far Eastern affairs. In 1904 and 1905 the sympathy of the whole Anglo-Saxon world was given unreservedly to the Japanese in their struggle with Russia, mainly because it was popularly, though erroneously, believed that they were engaged in a quixotic enterprise, the aim 1 of which was to defend the integrity of China and preserve the independence of Korea against the aggressive designs of the Colossus of Northern Europe. But during the past decade that judgment has been reversed, and the combat is now regarded as having been a war of expansion, upon the part of Japan no less than that of Russia. Korea and the three Eastern provinces had been the prey of Russia, but as a result of the war they became the quarry, of Japan. In what other light are subsequent events the annexation of Korea and the consolidation of Japans interests in Manchuria to be interpreted Ever since September 1914 Japans action as a member of the Entente Allies group has been shrouded in mystery. The military expedition against Kiao chau obviously was undertaken by the Japanese in order to rid themselves and their allies of the menace of a German naval base in the Pacific, But why was the successful issue of that exploit followed almost imme diately by an attempt to settle their differences with China And why were the Japanese tertns presented at Peking so ambiguously worded that for the time 5 Preface being it was impossible to tell exactly what they were Why was anultimatum forwarded, and backed up by a display of force And why did the Japanese Government at the very last moment withdraw the most objectionable group of its demands These questions and m ny others of similar import were asked in almost every capital of the Western world, but no satisfactory answers were forthcoming from responsible authorities. In the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey said no more than that to the best of his knowledge no accurate version of the Japanese demands had been published. Was it that he did not know what they were at the time he spoke and had not been consulted or informed by the Japanese Foreign Office before the drive aglainst China had been initiated The State Department at Washington issued a brief statement to the effect that Japans action involved no breach of the existing treaties, a note which if not particularly informing was at least reassuring. Why was the British Foreign Secretary even less ex plicit Had the Japanese Government violated the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance If not, then the British Government must have approved all of Japans demands, Group V as well as the others. In Japan itself there was almost as great uncertainty as to the significance of the Cabinets action at Peking. Were the demands and the ultimatum 1 merely a device to win the support of a chauvinistic nation for the Government, a pre-election policy to be discarded as soon as it had served its purpose, or was it an outcome of the stampeding of the Cabinet by its strong policy members Some countenance is lent the former hypothesis by the fact that as soon as the election campaign had terminated successfully for the Government the drive upon China slackened but ifthis interpretation be accepted, then why did the Cabinet, even though it enjoyed the support of a majority of the members of the Lower House, resign a few months later Was Count Okumas resigna-6 Preface tion the consequence of his foreign policy, or of the bribery scandal which involved one of the members of his Cabinet, Baron Oura, the Minister of Agricul ture and Commerce If the former, who exerted the pressure Certainly not the people, for there were no popular demonstrations of hostility against the Governments Chinese policy, in Tokyo or elsewhere...