In his latest work, Macesich examines democracy and its economic counterpart, the free market, and the place of money (monetary and fiscal policy as controlled by the state bureaucracy) in such a system. DeTocqueville warned in the first half of the 19th century that democracy could falter as a consequence of citizens' diminished interest in restraining central authority. And now, there is evidence that vote-maximizing behavior of politicians and politically induced cycles in such key variables as inflation, unemployment, government transfers, taxes and monetary growth have become a critical problem in American democracy. The author examines, then, how best to consider money, monetary policy and the monetary regime--increasingly a function of political/bureaucratic pressures--against the argument for a liberal, freely functioning trading world and for fully-employed, prosperous countries.



This study considers the constraints that must be placed on the exercise of discretionary authority by vote maximizing bureaucracies and political elites if democracy is to thrive and prosper. Satisfactory resolution of these issues is basic to reducing monetary uncertainty and stabilizing the long-term price level, according to Macesich. These issues are deeply rooted in traditional American ideology and experience, and the author makes this clear in weaving together historical, institutional, theoretical, philosophical, and empirical results in the case of money and monetary policy.