This book examines the legislative, representative, and control functions of national parliaments and parliamentary parties during the reform of European economic governance. The empirical analysis focuses on domestic approvals of anti-crisis measures (EFSF, ESM and the Fiscal Compact) in all member states of the Eurozone, and the extent to which parliaments and parties secured their competences in EU policy-making during that process. In order to address this question, Maatsch employs an interdisciplinary approach and analyses (i) in which state parliaments' formal powers in approval of anti-crisis measures were constrained, (ii) how parliamentary parties voted on the analysed measures, (iii) the dominant discourses of their proponents and opponents and (iv) which parties advocated neoliberal and which Keynesian measures. This book will appeal to advanced students and scholars of European integration, Europeanisation, and European governance, as well as policy advisers or researchers, working on the EMU, or the financial crises in particular.