The relationship between corruption and democratic performance has always
been a key question for political economists. It is important in terms of understanding
the incentives that may improve quality of life in less developed
countries. In the past, studies of this relationship have suffered from a lack of
analytical sophistication, failed to extract all available information from the
data, and assumed causal direction without empirical testing. No previous
study has utilized nearly all countries of the world across a large time span.
This book goes deeper by overcoming these analytical challenges. The analysis
includes data for 186 countries, from 1984 to 2004. The primary finding
suggests that IMF and World Bank policies of lowering corruption before
structural adjustment is granted are misguided. The book is addressed to advanced
scholars of comparative political economy and quantitative analytical
techniques, and includes a foreword by Dr. Andrew H. Wedeman and
Senator Dr. William P. Avery, providing a broad overview of the topic.