The golden democratic tradition of an informed and involved electorate freely and rationally choosing its public officials seems to be at odds with American political reality. Thus the questions: On what basis do people vote and form opinions? How does the lack of information at the individual level affect system performance?

In this collection twenty-six distinguished political scientists discuss, debate, and define the relationship between information and the democracy it supposedly serves. The contributors address both the empirical and normative aspects of governing in the United States, employing psychological, sociological, and economic perspectives.

Contributions by: John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, Edward G. Carmines, Henry W. Chappell, Philip E. Converse, John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, James M. Glaser, Robert Griffin, Robert Huckfeldt, Shanto Iyengar, William R. Keech, Michael Krassa, James H Kuklinski, Michael MacKuen, Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook, Victor C. Ottati, Wendy M. Rahn, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Paul M. Sniderman, Pablo T. Spiller, John Sprague, James A. Stimson, John L. Sullivan, Robert S. Wyer