For this important collection, Professor O'Hara has selected some cutting-edge previously-published work on the application of economic analysis to the conflict of laws. This authoritative two-volume set offers theoretical and empirical insights into existing approaches to choice of law and the effects of conflicting choice-of-law approaches on judicial decision-making. It investigates several competing proposals for more efficient choice-of-law systems, including a special section on torts. Further topics include evaluations of contract clauses (including choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions), and the effects of party choice on jurisdictional competition by states to provide more desirable laws, with examples relating to securities regulation, bankruptcy rules, law firm rules of ethics, same-sex marriage laws and asset protection trust law. A game theoretic analysis of interstate judgment recognition is also included.These two volumes will be an extremely useful resource for students and for scholars wishing to contribute to the next generation of the economics of conflict of laws.