Drawing insights from economics and political science, Judging Regulators explains why the administrative law of the US and the UK has radically diverged from each other on questions of law, fact, and discretion.

This book proposes an original interdisciplinary theory that integrates the concept of veto-gates into a strategic model of judicial review of administrative action. It argues that long-term changes in the number of effective veto-gates in the US and the UK are the key to understanding the antithesis that emerged between their administrative jurisprudence. It then forecasts the future of Anglo-American administrative law in light of recent destabilizing political developments, such as attempts by the US Congress to abolish Chevron deference and the UK Supreme Court's interventionist decision in R (on the application of Miller) v. The Prime Minister.

A crucial overview of the history and future of administrative law, this book is critical reading for scholars and students of public law and comparative law, particularly those focusing on comparative administrative law in common law contexts. Its theoretical insights will also be useful for political scientists and economists interested in judicial politics and regulation.