Europe is caught between the extreme diversity of national systems and the increasing complexity of supranational institutions. Some fear the worst. They claim that diversity is linked to insecurity because, from one country to another, the sanction for the same crime varies considerably. Several years' experience has shown in cases of transborder crimes that the development of mutual assistance pacts improves the efficiency of the national systems. Beyond that, it seems inevitable that, at least in the area of frauds against Community financial interests, we will arrive at a system of Community penal and administrative sanctions to meet the demand of the European Parliament, on the condition that the sanctions respect the democratic principles of legality and an independent judiciary. Starting from the plurality of European legal sources (Community law, the Conventions of the Council of Europe, the Schengen Accords, the Conference on Security and Co-operation) and their underlying logic (national interests, European interests, security/protection of fundamental rights), this volume examines their impact on the subjects of the Maastricht Treaty.
After describing practices of control and sanction, as well as procedures and guarantees, it tackles the ultimate question of common guiding principles. The bet being that, beyond the bottom line of current penal policy, it could be the design for - in the singular, no longer the plural - a criminal policy for the Europe of tomorrow.