This book explores the factors that influence the U.S. Army's intelligence-gathering operations, particularly those that have an impact on Human Intelligence (HUMINT). In the past, the success or failure of U.S. national security policies has to a large degree depended on the nation's ability to gather, analyze, and act on intelligence. But, as the author points out, in recent years, particularly since September 11, institutional inertia, a fundamental under-appreciation of the importance of HUMINT, the inability to effectively manage field operatives, the lack of language specialists, and the absence of any understanding of the enemy's culture have all undermined U.S. HUMINT operations. Illustrating his arguments with numerous examples from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the author challenges many of the accepted claims surrounding such high-profile events as the torture at Abu Ghraib, the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the hunt for Osama Bin Laden. The main point of this book, however, is to outline improvements to the Army's HUMINT capabilities, changes that are essential to the successful conduct of the Global War on Terror.