What evidence is sufficient to justify the release of a computer-based safety critical system? How should this evidence be presented to certification bodies or regulatory authorities? What best practices should be applied? These are just a few of the questions addressed by Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems, which provides a framework for the justification of the dependability of a computer-based system. The book also explores some of the more fundamental aspects of safety evaluation, such as the nature of claims, arguments and evidence, and the ways to deal with different types of uncertainty.
Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems will be of value to software and computer system engineers working in industry sectors such as nuclear safety. TOC:Part I: The Context.- Introduction.- Current Practices.- Axiomatic Justification and Uncertainty.- Justification and Dependability Case.- Part II: Prescriptions.- Requirements, Claims and Evidence.- Arguments, Syntax and Semantics.- Axiomatic Principles and Limits.- Part III: Descriptions.- Structures and Interpretations.- Embedded Computer System Structures.- Part IV: Methodological Implications.- Pre-existing Systems and Components.- Construction Methods.- Postface.