Much environmental deterioration - the greenhouse effect, deleption of the ozone layer and acid rain - has an intrinsic international dimension. The lack of a supra-national authority requires that countries agree on the decision to co-operate for pollution control. Hence, negotiations on international environmental issues need to be approached through appropriate policy strategies. This book presents new and important papers which examine international environmental negotiations and agreements seeking to protect the global environment. Policy analysis is performed within a game-theoretic strategic framework. Issues discussed include: existence, size and environmental impacts of self-enforcing agreements, the role of an arbitrator in environmental negotiations, the problems of interactions between environmental and trade and industrial polices, the influence of uncertainty on negotiations and agreements, the role of myopia of negotiators and of asymmetric interests between developed and less developed countries. This book not only presents current debates but also provides stimuli for further research.

International Environmental Negotiations will be of special interest to students, academics and professional environmentalists as well as policymakers.