Taking its departure in the concept of strategic culture, this book answers the question of why European countries decide either to participate or not in international military operations. This volume examines strategic culture and its relation to justifications of decisions made by France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, with regard to four different operations: Operation Enduring Freedom/ISAF in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, Operation Unified Protector in Libya, and EU Navfor/Atalanta outside Somalia. In this work, the authors closely analyse the role of civil-military relations with regard to decisions about participation.


What is the role of the armed forces in the political process leading up to the decision? What is their advisory capacity in shaping the mission? Employing a theoretical framework of strategic culture, including aspects of civil military relations, this innovative volume seeks to answer these questions. This text is essential reading for academics, researchers and students of international relations, foreign policy, war studies or civil-military relations.