At the end of World War II, British Naval Intelligence persuaded a number of German admirals held as prisoners-of-war to write essays setting out their thoughts on Germany's build up to war, the early victories, and its eventual defeat. These essays languished in the British archives, unnoticed by researchers until a father-son team of naval historians recognized their value. Nine of the best are included in this book. Among the authors are the heads of the Kriegsmarine, surface fleet, and naval intelligence, chief of the naval was staff, flag officer of U-boats, senior liaison officer to the Italian Navy, commander of small battle units, senior naval officer in the Black Sea, and C-in-C West. The raw immediacy of their opinions sets them apart from memoirs written years after the event, when time for reflection, access to records, and consultation with colleagues often moderate views. Of particular interest are their views on the influence of Hitler and the Nazi leadership on the war at sea, the changing technology of naval warfare, and the sharp differences of opinion on how victory might have been won. The admirals' opinions have been left exactly as they were expressed in 1945-46. For today's readers the Bennetts have placed the comments within the chronology of the war and clarified references. The book is arranged by themes, from the time of the Weimar Republic to the surrender, to allow readers to compare and contrast the opinions held by admirals of different levels of seniority and with different spheres of responsibility. Their essays clearly indicate their intimate knowledge of every aspect of the war at sea and the decision-making processes that determined Germany's conductof the war at sea.