The new field of experimental philosophy has emerged as the methods of psychological science have been brought to bear on traditional philosophical issues. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy is the place to go to see outstanding new work in the field. It features papers by philosophers, papers by psychologists, and papers co-authored by people in both disciplines. The series heralds the emergence of a truly interdisciplinary field in which people from different disciplines are working together to address a shared set of questions.
This new volume of Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy showcases the continuing development of the field. The submitted papers go ever more deeply into some of the issues that have long been central topics of experimental philosophy research (epistemic intuitions, metaethical intuitions, intuitions about causation) but also venture into new topics that illustrate the broadening the scope of experimental philosophy research (slurs, experimental economics, Socratic questionnaires). The volume concludes with three specially commissioned essays reviewing recent work on three central topics: causal judgment, knowledge ascription, and the experimental philosophy of consciousness.
