National Research Council; Policy and Global Affairs; Development, Security, and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eura National Academies Press (2009) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy and Global Affairs; Development, Security, and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eura National Academies Press (2006) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy and Global Affairs; Development, Security, and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eura National Academies Press (2004) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy and Global Affairs; Development, Security, and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eura National Academies Press (2007) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy And Global Affairs; Development Security and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eurasi National Academies Press (2007) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy And Global Affairs; Development Security and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eurasi National Academies Press (2009) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy and Global Affairs; Office of International Affairs; Office for Central Europe and Eurasia National Academies Press (1998) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
National Research Council; Policy And Global Affairs; Development Security and Cooperation; Office for Central Europe and Eurasi National Academies Press (2008) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
In response to a request from the U.S. Congress, this book examines how the unique experience and extensive capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) can be extended to reduce the threat of bioterrorism within developing countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU). During the past 12 years, DOD has invested $800 million in reducing the risk from bioterrorism with roots in the states of the FSU. The program's accomplishments are many fold. The risk of bioterrorism in other countries is too great for DOD not to be among the leaders in addressing threats beyond the FSU.
Taking into account possible sensitivities about a U.S. military presence, DOD should engage interested governments in about ten developing countries outside the FSU in biological threat reduction programs during the next five years. Whenever possible, DOD should partner with other organizations that have well established humanitarian reputations in the countries of interest. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization should be considered as potential partners.
Table of Contents
Front Matter Summary Introduction 1 Security Context for Geographical Expansion of the Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense 2 Capacities of Developing Countries to Counter Biological Threats 3 Applicability of Biological Threat Reduction Approaches in the Former Soviet Union to Other Developing Countries 4 Biosecurity-Related Activities of Other Organizations 5 Policy and Program Coordination and Integration 6 Recommendations Appendixes Appendix A: Presenters at Committee Meetings Appendix B: Organizations that Provided Background Information Appendix C: Summary Reports of Field Visits Appendix D: Organizations Considered by the Biological Threat Reduction Program as Stakeholders in the Program Appendix E: Selected Department of Defense Entities with Relevant Programs Appendix F: Selected U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with Relevant Programs Appendix G: Activities of International Organizations Appendix H: International Health Regulations Appendix I: Selected Foundations Appendix J: Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group Appendix K: Relevant Studies Appendix L: Biographies of Committee Members
