This study deals with the field of Russian politics and, in particular, Russian political argumentation. It contributes to the knowledge of political parties and politicians, and to the discussions of geopolitics in the Russian context. The principal question asked is what is the content and structure of the public arguments expressed by the leading politicians of the parties of power (partiia vlasti), the democratic and the communist opposition on Chechnia and NATO in 1994-2003? Nash Dom Rossiia (Our Home is Russia), Edinstvo (Unity) and Otechestvo (Fatherland) represent the parties of power, Iabloko the democratic opposition and Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) the communist opposition. Chechnia, especially separatism understood as an internal threat, and NATO, especially the eastward enlargement as an external threat, are focal points. Moreover, the interest lies in what we can say - based on these arguments - about the geopolitical visions of the political parties and about Russian political parties in general.
The primary data comprise Russian newspaper articles written by the politicians of the examined parties, their interviews, and party programmes. The data are analysed first using Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s narrative tool called geopolitical storyline, then by Stephen Toulmin’s model of argument and finally, by using the concept of a geopolitical vision (Gertjan Dijkink).
The main argument is that there are varying views on the argumentation level and on the geopolitical vision level. These variations do not exist only between the political parties, but also within the parties. In addition to proving that there is no single Russian view concerning these two cases, it also shows that there is no single opposition in Russia and that the opposition is not a permanent position, but that it varies from one case and context to another. For example, we find that if we compare the parties of power with the opposition parties, there are significant differences in argumentation concerning the internal threat, but not as many differences in argumentation concerning the external threat. In addition, we have found that the justification for the claims and the solutions offered are very far from each other in the democratic and in the communist opposition. We can also argue that even though arguments change from one context to another, we can find traces of more permanent geopolitical visions, which can be constructed on the basis of public arguments. A common factor to all the political parties examined here is that all of them emphasize and speak for Russia’s sovereignty and equal position in the world, and accuse the West of having double standards.
