Jose M. Diego (ed.); LuisJ. Goicoechea (ed.); J. Ignacio González-Serrano (ed.); Javier Gorgas (ed.) Springer (2012) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Matias Linan Reyes (ed.); Jose M. Flores Arias (ed.); Juan J. Gonzalez de la Rosa (ed.); Josef Langer (ed.); Bellido Outeiri Springer (2012) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Ellen F. Manzullo (ed.); Carmen Esther Gonzalez (ed.); Carmen P. Escalante (ed.); Sai-Ching J. Yeung (ed.) Springer (2015) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.); Dennis Dieks (ed.); Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.); Stephan Hartmann (ed.); Thomas Uebel (ed.) Springer (2016) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Javier Aramayona; Volker Diekert; Christopher J. Leininger; Pedro V. Silva; Armin Weiß; Juan González-Meneses (ed.); Lusti Birkhäuser (2017) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Paulo Novais (ed.); Jason J. Jung (ed.); Gabriel Villarrubia González (ed.); Antonio Fernández-Caballero (ed.); Ele Navarro Springer (2018) Saatavuus: Tilaustuote Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Springer Sivumäärä: 233 sivua Asu: Kovakantinen kirja Painos: 2014 Julkaisuvuosi: 2014, 06.03.2014 (lisätietoa) Kieli: Englanti
This book analyzes Bas van Fraassen’s characterization of representation and models in science. In this regard, it presents the philosophical coordinates of his approach and pays attention to his structural empiricism as a framework for his views on scientific representations and models. These are developed here through two new contributions made by van Fraassen. In addition, there are analyses of the relation between models and reality in his approach, where the complexity of this conception is considered in detail. Furthermore, there is an examination of scientific explanation and epistemic values judgments. This volume includes a wealth of bibliographical information on his philosophy and relevant philosophical issues.
Bas van Fraassen is a key figure in contemporary philosophy of science, as the prestigious Hempel Award shows. His views on scientific representation offer new ideas on how it should be characterized, and his conception of models shows a novelty that goes beyond other empiricists’ approaches of recent times. Both aspects — the characterization of scientific representation and the conception of models in science — are part of a deliberate attempt to forge a “structural empiricism,” an alternative to structural realism based on an elaborated version of empiricism.
