Edward Geist; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga; Dahlia Anne Goldfeld; Nina Miller; Shawn Cochran; Jeff Hagen; David R Frelinger RAND Corporation (2025) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Paul K Davis; J Michael Gilmore; David R Frelinger; Edward Geist; Christopher K Gilmore; Jenny Oberholtzer; Daniel Tarraf RAND Corporation (2019) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
William Marcellino; Madeline Magnuson; Anne Stickells; Benjamin Boudreaux; Todd C Helmus; Edward Geist; Zev Winkelman RAND Corporation (2020) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Michael J Mazarr; Ashley L Rhoades; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga; Alexis A Blanc; Derek Eaton; Katie Feistel; Edward Geist RAND Corporation (2022) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Aaron B Frank; Steven W Popper; Paul K Davis; Edward Geist; Ben Connable; Zev Winkelman; Robert L Axtell; Justin Grana RAND Corporation (2022) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Bryan Boling; Edward Geist; Benjamin Boudreaux; Alexis A Blanc; Christy Foran; Moon Kim; Kelly Klima; Erin Leidy; McBirn RAND Corporation (2022) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
Lance Menthe; Anthony Jacques; Li Ang Zhang; Edward Geist; Joshua Steier; Aaron B Frank; Erik van Hegewald; Gary Briggs RAND Corporation (2024) Pehmeäkantinen kirja
The dangerous, decades-long arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War begged a fundamental question: how did these superpowers actually plan to survive a nuclear strike? In Armageddon Insurance, the first historical account of Soviet civil defense and a pioneering reappraisal of its American counterpart, Edward M. Geist compares how the two superpowers tried, and mostly failed, to reinforce their societies to withstand the ultimate catastrophe.
Drawing on previously unexamined documents from archives in America, Russia, and Ukraine, Geist places these civil defense programs in their political and cultural contexts, demonstrating how each country's efforts reflected its cultural preoccupations and blind spots, and revealing how American and Soviet civil defense related to profound issues of nuclear strategy and national values. This work challenges prevailing historical assumptions and unearths the ways Moscow and Washington developed nuclear weapons policies based not on rational strategic or technical considerations, but in power struggles between different institutions pursuing their own narrow self-interests.